
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National Intelligence Bulletin

State Dept. review completed

DIA review(s) completed.

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
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


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CAMBODIA

Cambodian Prime Minister Long Boret returned to Phnom Penh yesterday and told Ambassador Dean there are no prospects for an immediate political solution or a cease-fire.

In Bangkok, Boret met Prince Sihanouk's son,
Norodom Yuvaneath, who said Sihanouk "will not negotiate"
and suggested that his father be invited back to Phnom
Penh, presumably to restore the monarchy. Boret could
not agree to this on his own authority; he instead emphasized that his government desired an early political
solution in which Sihanouk would play the key role.
Yuvaneath is en route to Peking to convey the message
to his father.

In Indonesia, Boret obtained Jakarta's help in interceding with Sihanouk through Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika. Boret said Bouteflika had also agreed to help and that if the slightest encouragement from Sihanouk were forthcoming, Boret would be available immediately to work out the details.

Sihanouk denied yesterday that any "authorized representative" had met Boret in Bangkok. He earlier criticized Indonesian President Suharto for "meddling" with the Cambodian situation.

In his conversation with Ambassador Dean, Boret also discussed evacuation plans in the event of a collapse in the defense of Phnom Penh. Two days earlier, Cambodian President Koy also asked Dean about the evacuation of Khmer leaders under such circumstances. The ambassador told both officials that some space would be available aboard US aircraft, but that he was not in a position to determine who or how many could be accomodated.

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Khmer communist forces have launched new attacks on the east bank of the Mekong opposite Phnom Penh but have not exploited their gains. Northwest of the capital, government elements have had little success in reestablishing control over recently lost positions on the outer defense line.

Along Route 4, recently established government defensive positions at Ang Snoul have come under insurgent fire.

the recent rains have forced many insurgents from prepared positions south of the highway. The government commander in this area believes that this will aid in defense operations at Ang Snoul by denying avenues of approach to the insurgents.

Southeast of Phnom Penh, the Cambodian army's high command has ordered its weakened defenses along Route 1 reinforced to block anticipated communist attacks. However, this effort probably will not greatly improve the government's ability to contain a concerted assault by the insurgents.

In the outlying areas, government counterattacks at Prey Veng have apparently halted communist advances. At Kompong Speu, rice and ammunition deliveries have improved the government's situation. Cambodian army troops have been shifted from other areas of the town to contain insurgent attacks against the eastern defenses, where heavy fighting is expected to continue.

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SYRIA-EGYPT

Relations between Damascus and Cairo have come under greater strain following President Sadat's uncoordinated request for the reconvening of the Geneva peace conference. Syrian suspicions that Sadat is still trying to obtain a separate Sinai disengagement agreement have also been strengthened by Sadat's unilateral extension of the UN mandate until the end of July and his pledge to reopen the Suez Canal.

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Sadat's tendency to act unilaterally has been a chronic bone of contention between Damascus and Cairo and a major source of Syrian distrust and dislike of the Egyptian President.

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In fact, the Syrians have yet to say anything publicly about Sadat's moves. Instead, they have vented their frustrations largely on the US. The government and Baath Party press have attacked US Middle East policy and expressed strong skepticism that a US policy reassessment will lead to any real change in Washington's approach to negotiations.

The Syrian press has lately demanded a prior commitment from Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders and recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians before the Geneva conference is reconvened. One columnist in the Baath Party paper even hinted that Syria might boycott the peace talks unless Israel makes such commitments.

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Asad will continue to advocate more formal Syrian-Palestinian ties simply because he seems to have few other ways at present of exerting any leverage over Cairo.

Asad probably still sees no alternative to trying to work with Egypt to obtain his own objectives; this would account for the absence of public Syrian attacks on Egyptian policy so far. Therefore, whatever actions Damascus takes over the next few months are likely to be aimed, at least in part, at curbing Sadat's independence and forcing him to coordinate his moves more closely with the

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
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Syrians.

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The Egyptians, for their part, believe they are the aggrieved party. Sadat feels that he proved his Arab credentials sufficiently by rejecting Israel's demand for a non-belligerency pact and thus forfeiting the return of Egyptian territory. He is clearly resentful that even this has not stopped Syrian attacks on Egyptian policy. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's harsh anti-Egyptian comments at an Arab foreign ministers' meeting just after the suspension of disengagement negotiations probably led directly to Sadat's deliberate snub of Asad a few days later at King Faysal's funeral.

Although Sadat and Asad have usually gotten along well in personal contacts, Sadat seems deliberately to have limited occasions for such contacts since the 1973 war in an effort to maintain his freedom of action in negotiations. The resultant deterioration in relations, however, has increased rather than decreased Sadat's problems with Syria and threatens ultimately to place even more constraints on his ability to maneuver.



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GREECE-TURKEY

Greece and Turkey are still at loggerheads over the Aegean, with each side maintaining that its actions are justified because of a threat from the other.

A high-level Greek Foreign Ministry official has admitted to the US embassy that Athens has sent troops to the Dodecanese and other islands in the Aegean in contravention of international treaty. The forces include military aircraft on Limnos. He said the action was necessary because Turkish leaders had repeatedly made threatening statements about the islands.

The official said that Athens was exercising restraint but could not allow more Turkish overflights of the islands, which he claimed caused panic among the civilian population and created uncertainties which had economic implications throughout Greece, such as bank withdrawals, hoarding, and discouragement of the tourist trade.

The Turks, for their part, view Athens' fortification of the islands as clear provocation. Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil told the US embassy on Monday that Ankara simply cannot have "armed aircraft carriers" so close to its shores. He said that, given the Greek actions, it was essential for Turkey to monitor the situation to see what was going on. He said the Turkish military had told him that its planes were not flying directly over the islands.

The Turkish government yesterday again denied that it had violated Greek air space and publicly charged Greece with a military buildup on the island. It said that Turkish aircraft will continue to fly over the Aegean in accordance with the rights given it by international law.

The Greeks believe that the Turks are trying to intimidate them, as well as to establish a de facto role

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for the Turkish armed forces in the Aegean. A Greek air force officer says that F-5 aircraft sent to Limnos late last month are to be used to intercept Turkish aircraft entering Greek air space. The officer claims that the planes will first try to divert the Turks and, if unsuccessful, will shoot the planes down. Athens has so far fired at the aircraft with 40-mm. antiaircraft guns but failed to hit them.

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The Turkish navy has also established an Aegean task force command at Izmir which will most likely be subordinated to the Aegean Command. The Fourth Army will serve as a nucleus to which units from other commands can be assigned to bring it to full strength. Divisional units will not immediately relocate to the Aegean coast. Forces having the mission of defending the eastern shoulder of the Bosporus and the eastern shores of the Sea of Marmara may also be assigned to the Fourth Army.

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CYPRUS

The Cyprus intercommunal talks will resume April 28 in Vienna, although sharp differences have arisen over the Greek Cypriot negotiating strategy.

Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot sector, announced yesterday that agreement had finally been reached on the role of the UN Secretary General and the venue of the talks. Denktash also announced that he would act as the Turkish Cypriot negotiator in at least the first sessions. Denktash said that Secretary General Waldheim would play no substantive role in the talks, although he could be of assistance on subjects mutually agreed on by the negotiators.

The talks are reportedly scheduled to last only until May 2, providing very little time to reach agreement on the sensitive issues to be discussed. The talks may continue at a lower level of representation after May 2, with Denktash and possibly Clerides returning home, or the talks themselves could be transferred back to Nicosia.

Clerides' role as the negotiator for the Greek Cypriots has been clouded in the past week, as a result of an apparent dispute with Archbishop Makarios over negotiating strategy. Clerides has come under sharp attack from pro-Makarios press and political groups as a result of a speech on April 1 in which he set out the realities of the Cypriot situation as he saw them.

Clerides argued that a bizonal federation as desired by the Turks was probably the solution that would provide the Greek Cypriots with the best opportunity of regaining some of the territory lost last summer and of achieving strong guarantees for the future. He also took issue with the concept of a "long-term struggle," a phrase that Makarios has used. Clerides said that only made sense if the Greek side expected eventually to resort to armed conflict to recoup its losses. Otherwise, a "long-term struggle" would only result in freezing the Turkish position.

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These statements drew immediate and heavy fire from pro-Makarios elements, but Clerides has not backed down and has repeated the ideas in subsequent speeches.

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There have, in fact, been several calls in the press for Clerides' resignation in recent days, and even reports that he has already resigned. Press reports from Ankara claim Clerides has denied presenting his resignation.

Clerides, however, is not above using the threat to resign as a tactic, perhaps in an effort to gain reassurances of support that will tie Makarios, and possibly the Greek government, to the unpopular concessions Clerides will have to make to obtain a settlement. Reports have already surfaced that Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis has asked Clerides to stay on.



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COLOMBIA

The National Security Council and the Council of Ministers met on April 3 to consider implementing a state of siege if growing labor problems and student unrest reach serious proportions in coming weeks.

Security officers are concerned with the recent increase in low-level insurgency by at least two of the country's three guerrilla groups. The reported recent meeting of leaders of these groups has led some government officials to conclude that the insurgents are testing the Lopez administration's ability to counter subversion. In addition, students in a southwestern province have been demonstrating in support of peasant marches against the government's economic policies. Other peasant disturbances have also been reported in the western and northern areas of the country.

Despite President Lopez' reluctance to impose a state of siege, he may soon be forced to do so if guerrilla activity and demonstrations continue. Security forces would be capable of effectively containing unrest should a state of siege be imposed. Such a measure has been used successfully several times in the past. Furthermore, the government could find a state of siege useful to avoid demonstrations following an impending increase in the price of gasoline.



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JAPAN

Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa arrives in Washington today for talks with Secretary Kissinger, their first meeting since Miyazawa assumed his post in December. One purpose of the visit is to lay the groundwork for a possible visit later this year by Prime Minister Miki, but Miyazawa will be anxious to discuss major substantive issues as well.

Of greatest importance to Miyazawa, despite the rush of events in Indochina, are the issues of Middle Eastern peace and the possibility of another Arab oil embargo. Miyazawa will be anxious to hear US appraisals of the military situation and of the prospects for resuming talks on an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel. He will also want to explore the outlook for reconvening the Geneva conference.

The preliminary conference of oil producers and consumers, now in session in Paris, is also of prime concern to Tokyo. With negligible reserves of oil, gas, and coal, the Japanese have difficulty in accepting US views on the use of floor prices for imported oil to encourage development of alternative energy sources.

A second major area of discussion will be Indochina. Japan has never felt its security directly tied to events in Indochina and is presently intent mainly on not identifying with either of the warring parties. Miyazawa, however, will try to highlight areas of potential US-Japanese cooperation in Indochina, focusing on humanitarian measures.

The foreign minister may also ask the US to reaffirm security commitments to Japan--in the context of the Miki government's long-standing desire to win right-wing support for ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Linked with the security issue will be the problem of nuclear weapons on visiting US warships.

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Despite some differences of opinion--on oil and on Indochina--Miyazawa comes to the US as a long-time friend and supporter of the US-Japan alliance. Furthermore, because Miyazawa has been cultivating the ruling party's right wing in an effort to enhance his acceptability for a possible future bid for the prime ministership, he will try to avoid overt controversy with the US. The Miki government, moreover, is still uncertain of its political strength and on the eve of important local elections is determined to avoid any hint of disorder in relations with a major ally.

FOR THE RECORD

South Korea: President Pak issued a new "emergency decree" yesterday to help control persistent student dissent. The decree permitted authorities to close down Seoul's Korea University, occupy the campus with troops, and arrest students without warrant. It also provides penalties of up to ten years in jail. Three other Seoul universities have been closed down by school administrators. Both the students and the government have linked their actions to events in Indochina. The students charge that the Pak government, because it is corrupt and unpopular, may become as vulnerable as the Thieu regime. A government spokesman has asserted that a communist threat similar to that in Indochina exists in Korea, making it necessary to maintain a firm hand in dealing with dissent.

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